Income mobility may be seen as arising from two sources: (i) the transfer of income among individuals with total income held constant, and (ii) a change in the total amount of income available. In this paper, we propose several sensible properties defining the concept of income mobility and show that an easily applicable measure of mobility is uniquely implied by these properties. We also show that the resulting measure is additively decomposable into the two sources listed above, namely, mobility due to the transfer of income within a given structure and mobility due to economic growth or contraction. Finally, these results are compared and contrasted with other mobility concepts and measures in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
One of the important issues that can be studied with longitudinal data, and only with longitudinal data, is that of income mobility.
1 Indeed, as more longitudinal data sets become available for an increasing number of countries, the literature on the measurement of income mobility has become quite extensive in the last two decades.
The purpose of this paper is to derive a theoretically justified measure of absolute income mobility which can be applied to longitudinal data. We ask and attempt to answer the following three questions: (1) Has income mobility (movement) taken place in a given economy over time,
and if so, how much? (2) When does one economy, group, or time period exhibit more income variation than another? (3) What are the sources of income mobility?
To address these questions properly, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by income mobility, a concept on which there is hardly agreement either conceptually or practically. The approach followed in this paper is to specify some properties which an index of (absolute) income mobility that focuses on the variation of individual incomes should satisfy, and then to use these as axioms to characterize a mobility measure. Since it will be shown that this characterization analysis yields a unique measure, one can view what the resulting index measures as equivalent to the definition of absolute income mobility. In consequence, there can be no debate on whether we are successfully measuring what we want to or not, and conversely, if one dislikes the derived measure, then we immediately know that the fundamental dispute is about the basic conception of absolute income movement/mobility, not about the way we intend to measure it.
Another aim of the present work is to demonstrate how the sources of (absolute) mobility can be gauged by disaggregating this new measure. In doing this, we shall regard income mobility as arising from two sources: transfer of money among individuals with total income held constant, and changes in the total income available.
To illustrate the first of these, suppose we have three individuals with incomes $1, $2, and $3, so the initial income distribution is (1,2,3). Let the third individual transfer $2 to the first individual so that the resulting distributional change can be denoted as = (1,2,3) → = (3,2,1). Unlike the standard literature on income inequality, in which anonymity is a fundamental assumption, in the present context, it matters which individuals have what amount of income. Income mobility has taken place in → precisely because money has changed hands. More generally, holding the total income constant, the larger is one person's income gain (and the larger is another's loss), the more mobility (movement) there is. So, for instance, there would be more mobility in (1,2,3) → (4,2,0) than in (1,2,3) → (3,2,1).
The second source of income mobility arises because of changes in the total amount of income available. As a trivial example, one can think of a Robinson Crusoe economy where
Crusoe's income shifts from $0 to $100 in a given period. We would say that some mobility has taken place (although the relative position of Crusoe is vacuously the same). To give another example, let us start with an initial distribution of income given by = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,2), and suppose that one additional high-income position is created and filled by one of the previously low-income individuals: = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) → = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2). (Absolute) income mobility has taken place because of the creation of an additional high-income position. If even
The Meaning and Measurement of Income Mobility 5 more high-income positions had been created, say (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2) → = (1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2), there would have been more income mobility. Development economists call this process modern sector enlargement, and agree that there is more of it in going from to than from to .
In passing, we note that mobility and inequality comparisons can move in completely different directions. For instance, while (1, 2, 3) and (3, 2, 1) are clearly equally unequal, it is difficult to dispute that the process (1, 2, 3) → (3, 2, 1) exhibits a positive amount of income variation. To give another example, notice that there is one dollar worth of income growth in both : (1, 2, 3) → (1, 2, 4) and in : (1, 2, 3) → (2, 2, 3), and a reference to impartial treatment of individuals might urge one to conclude that the (absolute) mobility (movement) depicted in the processes A and B are the same, yet A represents an unambiguous increase in inequality whereas B has an unambiguous decrease in inequality. The distinction between income inequality and what we mean here by ''mobility'' should be kept in mind in what follows.
This paper seeks to derive a measure of (absolute) income mobility which focuses on aggregate income movement, and which encompasses both mobility due to the transfer of income and mobility due to growth and to justify the choice of a mobility measure on fundamental grounds. The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss a number of properties which are guided by the two sources of mobility described above, and which, we believe, characterize income mobility. Taking these properties as axioms, we derive in Section 3 a new, very easily applicable mobility measure which is uniquely consistent with the specified set of axioms. In this sense, what we intend to measure and what we actually measure coincide. In Section 4, we demonstrate that our measure of total mobility is additively decomposable into two parts, one attributable to transfer mobility and the other attributable to growth mobility. This shows rigorously that the above mentioned sources are the only determinants of our conception of mobility. Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the relationship between our approach and others in the literature. We close with a concluding
section. An appendix supplies the proofs of the main results stated in the text.
AXIOMS FOR A MEASURE OF INCOME MOBILITY
Take + as the space of all income distributions with population ≥ 1. Let = ( 1 , 2 , … , ) ∈ + , where corresponds to the income level of the th person, = 1,2, … , .
Suppose becomes ∈ + , where the individuals are ordered the same in as in : → . Before stating the axioms, it should be stressed that we view as a measure of total mobility in a population of people and the following axioms should be considered with this in mind. However, this might cause problems when the sizes of the groups being analyzed vary, e.g. as between one longitudinal survey and another, or between one group and another within the same longitudinal survey. Therefore, in empirical applications, one might also be interested in per capita and/or percentage mobility measurement. Given → , , ∈ + , ≥ 1, accepting as a total mobility index, the per capita measure would be defined as
and the percentage measure would take the form
Taking these as definitions, axiomatizing amounts to axiomatizing and as well. In other words, the characterization of the total mobility index will implicitly yield a characterization for both the per capita mobility index and the percentage mobility index .
We now proceed to a discussion of the set of axioms that will characterize .
Axiom 2.1 (Linear homogeneity
). For ≥ 1, ( , ) = ( , ) for all > 0, , ∈ + .
Axiom 2.2 (Translation invariance).
For ≥ 1, ( + 1 , + 1 ) = ( , ) for all > 0, , ∈ + such that + 1 , + 1 ∈ + , where 1 ≡ (1,1, … ,1) ∈ + .
Axiom 2.3 (Normalization). 1 (1,0) = 1 (0,1) = 1. Weak decomposability asserts that total income mobility is a nontrivial function of the observed changes in the income levels of the constituent individuals. It certainly carries the same spirit as the symmetry, decomposability and smoothness assumptions of Cowell [14] while being technically weaker. Since the intuitive support for the assumptions of continuity and symmetry is straightforward, it appears natural to view Axiom 2.4* as a rather innocuous postulate.
Our next axiom is an independence condition:
Axiom 2.5 (Population consistency). Let , ≥ 2, , ∈ + and , , ∈ + . Then,
In effect, what this axiom says is that in the context of populations of different sizes, if equals are added to equals the results are equal. Let → be observed in a population of n individuals and let → be observed in another population of individuals. Suppose that the level of income mobility is judged to be the same in the two situations. Axiom 2.5 says that if an agent with initial income level ≥ 0 and final income level ≥ 0 is added to both situations, then the two should still have the same mobility. In other words, if → has the same mobility as → , then ( , ) → ( , ) has the same mobility as ( , ) → ( , ) for any , ≥ 0.
We view Axiom 2.5 as a reasonable assumption for a total mobility index to satisfy. Axioms 2.1, 2.2 and 2.6 hold.)
The essence of this axiom is that if unequals are added to equals, the results are unequal.
Put precisely, it says that if all individuals except one have the same mobility in two situations but that one individual experiences more mobility in one situation than another, then the two situations must have different levels of mobility. This axiom is identical with Axiom 2.5 of Ebert
[16] and seems fairly unexceptionable.
We come now to our final axiom:
It may seem plausible that regardless of whether a given individual's income change is counted in dollars, squared dollars, logged dollars, or whatever, the absolute contribution of that individual's income change to the total mobility in the economy should be independent of how it is that other people's incomes change. What Axiom 2.7 states is that the contribution of one income recipient's income change to total mobility depends only on the amount of his/her income change; by implication, it is independent of the other's income changes.
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Nevertheless, Axiom 2.7 appears to be considerably more demanding than the previous axioms we have considered for a mobility measure. Indeed, it implies a strong form of separability and excludes great many functional forms. For this reason, we shall start exploring the implications of the axioms put forth above without invoking the postulate of individualistic contribution at first. This yields a class of mobility measures with uncountably many members, and the usefulness of Axiom 2.7 shows itself at this point. Including this postulate into our axiom set results in characterizing a unique income mobility measure. So, the result one gets from such an admittedly strong axiom is also a very strong one. Since individualistic contribution is not merely a mathematical requirement, but rather possesses a clear economic interpretation, this may be viewed as a positive virtue.
MEASUREMENT OF INCOME MOBILITY
Our first result is a complete characterization of the class of measures induced by Axioms 2.1-6. Although these results generate an interesting class of total mobility measures, one has to pick a certain member of this class (that is, choose a certain > 0) in practical computations.
Although any such choice will result in a mobility measure which would satisfy Axioms 2.1-2.6, it will also imply a further specification of the notion of income mobility beyond what is captured by these axioms. 7 In other words, an arbitrary specification of might disguise the basic premise behind the induced mobility measure. However, at least in one particular case, we do not run into this difficulty. Indeed, adding Axiom 2.7 to our set of postulates easily reduces the large class of measures introduced in Theorem 3.1 to a singleton. In fact,
) for all , , ∈ + , ≥ 2, for some continuous and strictly increasing : + → + such that (0) = 0, and assume that Remarks. (i) One might think that to derive an economic distance function axiomatically, the usual metric axioms should be explicitly used (see Shorrocks [40] and Ebert [16] ). However, the only axioms that are posited on in the characterization theorem above are Axioms 2.1-2.7; that is, the fact that ° satisfies the distance axioms is a result, not an assumption. We view this as one of the good features of our set of axioms, since why an economic distance function should satisfy the triangle inequality as an axiom is not entirely clear.
(ii) Due to its linearity feature, ° is additively subgroup decomposable in the sense that the total mobility in the full population is the sum of the total mobilities of each of the subpopulations.
(iii) Ebert [16] derives a class of statistical measures of distance between two income distributions, and his main result is rather similar to this theorem. However, the idea developed in that paper does not correspond to a distance function measuring absolute income mobility since anonymity is substantially used in Ebert's axiomatization. As noted in Section 2, a characterization of the total mobility measure ° also entails a characterization of both the per capita mobility measure ° and the percentage mobility measure °, via (1) and (2) respectively:
Notice that, gauging per capita and percentage mobility this way, two societies with the same total mobility but different population sizes would have different per capita mobility, and two societies with the same per capita mobility but different base incomes would exhibit different percentage mobility. Within the sociological literature a distinction is made between changes in mobility that can be attributed to the increased availability of positions in higher social classes and those changes that can be attributed to an increased intergenerational movement among social classes, for a given distribution of positions among these classes.
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Markandya [30] proposed two alternative procedures for decomposing total mobility into components due to structural mobility (the first type of mobility noted in the quotation above) 8 For a fruitful implementation of the measures introduced above, °, ° and °, one may have to distinguish between time series and cross country studies. If the empirical comparisons of mobility are to be made across time periods within a country, income changes should be measured in terms of constant units of the country's currency, and if they are to be made across countries, the currencies need to be expressed in the same units by using the most appropriate exchange rate or purchasing power parity conversion. 9 Markandya [28] , pp. 307-308, emphasis in the original. is not needed, it is better to avoid making it.) (ii) Markandya's procedure requires the analyst to specify a social welfare function to measure welfare changes while one might prefer to deal with income changes directly. (iii) Total mobility is not additively decomposable into structural and exchange mobility components using his measure. It is rather discomforting that it matters so much empirically which is primary and which is residual.
In our framework, (i) and (ii) are readily handled, while (iii) can be overcome by proceeding as follows. Let us first take the basic concept of mobility due to a transfer of income.
This involves transfers of income from one individual to another, holding income the same, e.g., (The distributional change in situation B is a special kind of transfer called an exchange; it is this notion that has dominated the recent literature on mobility.) Note that in each of these cases, there are winners and losers, and whatever is lost by the losers is won by the winners; what varies in these different situations is the amount transferred from losers to winners. 11 Our basic premise is that the total mobility is strictly increasing in the transferred amount, holding total income constant.
In light of the above treatment, given → , , , ∈ + with ∑ ≥ ∑ =1
=1
, we can measure the total mobility due to transfer of income as twice the amount lost by losers. That is, letting ℒ ( , ) ≡ { ∈ {1,2, … , }| − > 0} be the set of losers in → , we define mobility due to transfer of income in a growing economy as
) (''Twice'' because every dollar lost by a loser is gained by a winner.) On the other hand, we define mobility due to transfer of income in a shrinking economy (that is when ∑ < =1 ∑ =1 ) as
) where ( , ) ≡ { ∈ {1,2, … , }| − > 0} is the set of winners.
11 Here, a ''winner'' is defined as a person whose income increases and a ''loser'' is a person whose income decreases. This is thus an income-sensitive concept of winners and losers. Alternatively, one might conceive of winners and losers in terms of changes in position. In fact, a referee of this journal justly argued that in the process (1,2,3) → (5,4,3) the third individual should be deemed a ''loser'' since she loses her relative superiority during the transformation. We certainly agree with this argument from the point of view of ranks. Yet our entire study is conducted in terms of income changes, and therefore it is only consistent to qualify an individual as a ''loser'' according to that person's own income change. All of our mobility measures deliberately focus only on personal income changes and are thus insensitive to rank reversals in general (recall Axiom 2.4). For a further elaboration on this point, see the last paragraph of Section 5.5.
Let us now turn to mobility due to economic growth (or contraction). When growth occurs, winners can win without anyone losing, e.g.,
Insert Table 1 Here Although these different cases involve different patterns of gains-in particular, the change in case is a more egalitarian growth pattern than the change in case , though both are Pareto improving-what is important for present purposes is the total amount gained or lost. Once again, the basic premise is that total mobility is strictly increasing in the total amount gained, holding the amount lost by losers constant (in this case, at zero). Consequently, given → , , , ∈ + , we define the total mobility due to economic growth as
Similarly, total mobility due to economic contraction is defined as
Let , , ∈ + be arbitrary and denote ℒ ( , ) and {1,2, … , } ℒ ( , ) ⁄ by ℒ and , respectively. Therefore, in the case of a growing economy, we have Similarly, in a shrinking economy we have
This, in view of Proposition 3.4, establishes the following observation:
where satisfies Axioms 2.1-2.4, 2.6 and 2.7 (or, Axioms 2.1-2.3 and 2.4*-2.7).
The per capita and percentage mobility (observed in → ) due to the transfer of income and that due to economic growth can also be defined as ) ( , ) + (  1  ∑ =1 ) ( , ) , , ∈ + respectively. Similar decompositions hold in the case of a shrinking economy.
By virtue of the above decompositions, we conclude that the measures proposed above (°, ° and °) satisfy the two basic properties noted in the introduction. First, they are sensitive to transfers to income in the sense that, for given initial and final income totals, the larger (the absolute value of) income changes for the constituent individuals, the more income mobility there is. Second, they are sensitive to improved (or diminished) economic opportunities
The Meaning and Measurement of Income Mobility 20 in the aggregate, i.e. the larger are the gains in income (or losses in income) in the cross-sectional income distributions, the more mobility there is. It is, in this sense, we say that they are comprehensive measures of mobility.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER MOBILITY CONCEPTS

Relation with the Relevant Sociological Literature
The decomposition analysis given in the preceding section is similar in spirit to the sociological literature where an explicit distinction is made between structural and exchange mobility (see Bartholomew [6] and the references cited therein). Our approach allows for both kinds of mobility to occur, but with one notable difference: We are concerned not with the movement among unordered social classes or groups (e.g., manual, non-manual, farm occupations, or each of a number of geographic entities) as the sociologists are, but rather with the movement among income (or, earnings, consumption, decile) levels.
One way of relating our approach to income mobility to the sociological notion of the movement among social classes is as follows. Given → , , , ∈ + , identify each social class mobility measure:
where > 0 denotes the initial proportion of people in class , and stands for the scale of status of class (see Sommers and Conlisk [44, p. 169] ). Applying the interpretation outlined in the preceding paragraph, given → , (and hence, ( , )), , , ∈ + , the relevant set of classes are given by ( ) ∪ ( ), with income level denoting the scale of status of ( , ) ∈ ( ) ∪ ( ). But then since each of these classes is composed of exactly one individual by construction, = 1⁄ , = ( , ), = 1,2, … , , and moreover, in the th row of ( , ), we have zeroes everywhere other than the entry in the cell that corresponds to ( , ) × ( , ), which is, of course, 1. Therefore, in this case, (4) becomes
, precisely our per capita mobility measure °( , ).
Although the above analysis builds a bridge between the theoretical mobility studies in the sociology literature and income mobility, we should note that, to the best of our knowledge, (4) has been neither characterized axiomatically nor proposed as a measure of income mobility, nor would sociologists care to characterize each income level as a separate social class. In this sense, we believe, ° retains its originality.
Consistency with the Notion of Exchange Mobility
In much of the empirical literature the original data are transformed into percentile classes and the mobility of individuals among these groupings is examined. 12 The identifying characteristics of this type of analysis are that class is given a certain rank, and that mobility is . 13 We shall denote this transformation by → .
According to [3] and [4] , any such diagonalizing switch reduces mobility; that is, if → , then one should conclude unambiguously that exhibits less mobility than .
How does ° behave with respect to this particular kind of exchange mobility? To answer this question, we have to distinguish between two kinds of diagonalizing switches. Let → . We shall say that this diagonalizing switch is of type 1 if ∉ diag , and it is of type 2 otherwise. Now, let , , ∈ ( , ), , ∈ + , and ( , ) and ( , ) be the transition matrices that represent → and → , respectively, and further satisfy ( , ) → ( , ). One can easily show that if the diagonalizing switch is of type 1, °( , ) =°( , ), and if it is of type 2, °( , ) >°( , ). 14 (To see this, notice that , ∈ ( , ) implies
. The proposition can then be verified by direct computation.) 13 Four changes are needed to preserve the bistochasticity of ( , ), (i.e., that ∑ =1 = ∑ =1 = 1), which arises from the assumption that each class has exactly the same number of members (e.g., 10 percent of the population) at all times. 14 Of course, this proposition also holds for and .
The above observation is hardly surprising. A type 1 diagonalizing switch exchanges the amounts gained (if the switch is above the diagonal) and the amount lost (if it is below the diagonal). Our measure says that if some people move up one class more and an equal number move up one class less, mobility is unchanged. However, with a type 2 diagonalizing switch, there are both winners and losers, and such a switch reduces the number of both while keeping more people in their original classes. Naturally enough, our measure says that mobility is strictly reduced by any such switch.
Consistency with the Notion of Monotonicity in Distance
As defined in Section 4, transfer mobility arises when one person's income gain is another person's income loss, holding total income constant. A key concept regarding mobility in this setting is monotonicity in distance which was introduced by Cowell [14] . To define this property, let ′ , ′ ∈ + be defined such that for some 1 ≤ , ≤ , ≠ and ′ = , ′ = for all ≠ , , for an arbitrary small number . Let be a directed distance function from + 2 to the real line, i.e. an antisymmetric function which is strictly increasing (decreasing) in the first (second) argument such that ( , ) = − ( , ) for all , ≥ 0. A mobility measure : + × + → + is said to be monotonic in
for some directed distance function d ([14, pp. 138-139] ). It is argued that this property ''appears to be related to the preference for diagonalizing switches in a transition matrix'' (Atkinson et al. [4, p. 32] ).
The monotonicity in distance axiom as stated in (5) and (6) has one counter-intuitive implication which can be demonstrated by a simple example. Let = = (1,1). Since, for any directed distance function , ( 1 , 2 ) = ( 1 , 2 ), (5) implies that ( , ′ ) = ( , ). In other words, a mobility measure monotonic in distance has to see the same amount of mobility in
(1,1) → (1,1) and in (1,1) → (1 + , 1 − ), ≠ 0, a highly implausible conclusion. This difficulty is, however, clearly an exception, and is remedied immediately if we replace the sgn(•) function above by its restriction to \{0}. It is then easy to verify that our measures °, ° and ° satisfy this modified version of monotonicity in distance. In this sense, we claim that our measure of mobility is consistent with the basic premise behind the monotonicity in distance property.
Relation with Other Axiomatic Approaches
An earlier attempt to study the measurement of mobility axiomatically is that of Shorrocks [38] , who postulated several axioms on the mobility index ( ), being any
(Perfect Mobility). If all rows of are identical, ( ) = 1, (4) (Monotonicity). An increase in an off-diagonal element at the expense of the diagonal strictly increases the value of the index.
Shorrocks [38] shows that the normality, perfect mobility and monotonicity axioms are incompatible.
We should note, however, that axioms (1) and (3) appear unexceptionable only in an intergenerational context where the fundamental question is about the notion of temporal dependence (that is, the degree to which a son's class is determined by that of his father.) This is not the question that is addressed by the present work. Our concern here is rather with the measurement of how much movement has taken place in a given transformation. (See [38] and [6, for illuminating discussions of the distinction between these two concepts of mobility.) In this particular context, the ''perfect mobility'' and ''normalization'' axioms appear questionable.
To see this, suppose we have a two class society (each class being denoted by 1 and 2) with the transformation (1,1,2,2) → (1,2,1,2). For such a distributional change, the transition matrix would take the form [ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 ] which exhibits ''perfect mobility'' according to Shorrocks' perfect mobility axiom. Yet the process (1,1,2,2) → (2,2,1,1) shows more movement-this was also noted by Bartholomew [6] -so in this sense the mobility associated with the transition matrix above is not maximal. If we think of these values as incomes, we can go even further. A change like (1,1,2,2) → (3,3,0,0) would exhibit more mobility than
(1,1,2,2) → (1,2,1,2) or (1,1,2,2) → (2,2,1,1), and a change like (1,1,2,2) → (6,0,0,0) would involve even more mobility than that. Finally, we note that all these changes have held total income constant. If, in addition, we allow for income growth to take place as well, mobility can increase without limit, which is why we also feel that the normalization axiom is unacceptable in the present context. Finally, we should mention the recent account given by Shorrocks [42] , which explores the compatibility of several mobility indices with twelve candidate mobility axioms. All of these indices are measures of relative income mobility in the sense of being scale invariant. 15 Examples of relative mobility measures are: the correlation coefficient (McCall [31] ), rank correlation (Schiller [35] ), Lillard and Willis [26] , Gottschalk [20] ), average jump in rank (but not income), Hart's index (Hart [22] ), Maasoumi and Zandvakili index (Maasoumi and Zandvakili [27] ) and Shorrocks' index (Shorrocks [39] We then showed that this mobility measure is additively decomposable into two components, one due to transfers of income from losers to winners, and the other due to growth in the total amount of income. No other exact decomposition of income mobility has appeared in the literature before.
Finally, we compared our measure with others that have appeared in the literature. We observed that although, with some stretch of the model, an approach in the sociological literature comes close to our measure, the fit is by no means exact. In the economics literature, most approaches are Markovian and/or normative, and the descriptive ones are often couched in relative terms as opposed to absolute terms. In this sense, we believe our study complements the existing literature by focusing on the objective measurement of total, per capita and percentage (absolute) income mobility. Fix ≥ 2 and pick arbitrary , , ≥ 0. Since Axiom 2.1 implies that is surjective on + 2 for any ≥ 2, we can choose 1 , +1 , 1 , +1 ≥ 0 such that 1 ( 1 , 1 ) = , and 1 ( +1 , +1 ) = ,, and 2 , 2 ∈ + −1 such that −1 ( 2 , 2 ) = . Then, by Axiom 2.4, and
We may therefore conclude that (7) holds for all ≥ 2.
We proceed with a number of lemmata. Consequently, in view of (14), But recalling that must be continuous at the origin, = 0 obtains. In conclusion, ( , ) = + for all , ≥ 0. But then, that is, −1 satisfies Cauchy's basic functional equation. Therefore, −1 ( ) = for all > 0 must be true for some > 0, and Proposition 3.3 follows. Table 1 
